Alternative Form of Dempster's Rule for Binary Variables
Dempster's rule is the fundamental rule in Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions (Shafer 1976) for combining items of evidence pertaining to a variable. The general form of Dempster's rule as presented by Shafer (1976) is conceptually easy to understand but computationally very complex to operationalize. In particular, if one is trying to develop analytical models for assessing such risks as audit risk (Srivastava et al 2004a) , fraud risk (Srivastava et al 2004b) , and auditor's independence risk (Turner et al. 2004) , the general form is not of much help.
In this research note, we develop an alternative form of Dempster's rule for combining items of evidence that pertain to a binary variable. The alternative form of Dempster's rule presented in this article provides not only a closed form formula for efficient computation but also enables researchers to develop closed form analytical formulae for assessing risks as mentioned earlier. Such analytical formulae are needed, especially when empirical evidence shows that auditors do think of uncertainties in terms of belief functions as demonstrated by Harrison et al. (2002) .
Dempster's Rule of Combination for Binary Variables
Dempster's rule of combination of beliefs from two independent items of evidence is given by (Shafer 1976) :
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where m(A) represents the combined m-value on A, m 1 and m 2 represent the two sets of mvalues 1 , on the frame Θ, and K represents the renormalization constant. The second term in K represents the conflict between the two items of evidence. If the conflict term is 1, i.e., if the two items of evidence exactly contradict each other, then K = 0 and, in such a situation, the two items of evidence are not combinable. In other words, Dempster's rule cannot be used when K = 0.
In order to derive the general form of Dempster's rule for a binary variable, we first consider the above formula for two items of evidence and then generalize it for n-items of evidence. Let us consider a binary variable X with two values: 'x', that the variable X is true and '~x' that the variable is not true. The frame of discernment, Θ, is given by Θ = {x, ~x}. Let us assume the following m-values to represent the two set of beliefs obtained from two independent items of evidence pertaining to variable X:
Evidence 1: m 1 (x), m 1 (~x), and m 1 (Θ).
Evidence 2: m 2 (x), m 2 (~x), and m 2 (Θ).
The combined m-values using Dempster's rule given in Equations (1) and (2) can be written as:
where K is given by 1 Shafer (1976) calls these m-values as the basic probability mass assignment function whereas Smets (1990a Smets ( , 1990b Smets ( , 1998 calls them the basic belief mass assignment function.
Equations (3) and (4) can be rewritten 2 as:
and the renormalization constant K in Equation (5) can be rewritten as:
Equations (5), (7) and (8) give the combined m-values for binary variable, X, when two independence items of evidence pertaining to the variable are combined using Dempster's rule. 
where K is given by n n n
The plausibility functions can be written 3 as:
n n
The proof of the above proposition is straight forward extension of Equations (5), (7)- (9) through induction. As one can see, Equations (10)-(13) provide a way to not only compute the resultant beliefs efficiently but also help one derive analytical formulae for the overall beliefs in a complex situation where the decision maker has several independent items of evidence pertaining to a binary variable. Such situations are quite common in the real world. For example, the auditor while conducting a financial audit encounters multiple items of evidence for a given account. The above results have been used by Srivastava et al (2004) , Turner et al (2004a, 3 By definition: Pl(x) = 1 -Bel(~x) which yields:
where K is defined in (13).
2004b) in deriving analytical formulae for assessing the overall audit risk 4 , fraud risk and independence risk in a financial audit.
Applications to Business Decisions
In this section we show the usefulness of the alternative form of Dempster's rule in computing the overall beliefs on a binary variable and also show how this form makes it easy to develop analytical formulae for assessing fraud risk.
Numerical Example: Information Systems Security Risk Sun et al. (2004) have recently developed an evidential reasoning approach to assessing information systems security risk. They use the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions to model the uncertainties involved in the evidence. We use part of their model, as depicted in Figure 1 , to illustrate the value of the alternative form of Dempster's rule. As seen in Figure 1 , we have seven items of evidence pertaining to the assertion "Customer information is protected from unauthorized internal access and is used in ways associated with the entity's business." Let us assume that we have the following set of m-values from the seven items of evidence that the assertion is true (t), not true (~t), or we don't know whether it is true or not true, {t, ~t}. 4 Audit risk is defined as the risk that the auditor has given a clean opinion on the financial statements but there is a possibility that financial statements may contain material misstatements due to errors and fraud. Fraud risk is the risk that financial statements contain material misstatements due to management fraud. Independence risk is the risk that the auditor is not independent of the audit client while conducting the financial audit. Plausibility that the assertion "Customer information is protected from unauthorized internal access and is used in ways associated with the entity's business" is not true represents the risk related to this assertion. Sun et al. (2004) discuss information security risk in great detail.
As we can see from the above example, the alternative form of Dempster's rule makes it very convenient to compute the combined beliefs in one step. In fact, one can easily program the logic in MS Excel Spreadsheet to compute the combined m-values for a large number of independent items of evidence.
Fraud Risk
Srivastava et al. (2004) should not attach too much weight on these items of evidence when they pertain to "No Fraud" assertion. Ultimately, if the assessed risk of fraud is high then the auditor should perform forensic procedures (FP) to detect fraud. All these items of evidence are depicted in Figure 2 through rectangular boxes. They all pertain to one assertion or variable that "There is no fraud in objective O of account A". We assume that this variable has two values, "yes, fraud is present (yf)" and "no, fraud is not present (nf)."
The opportunity to commit fraud and also the type of routine audit procedures depend on the specific assertion 5 of the account in interest. For example, accounts receivable balance would be overstated if management created fictitious sales on credit. In order to detect this fraud, the auditor needs to perform audit procedures that are specific to the objective "Existence" of accounts receivable, which implies that the account receivable balance is not overstated due to fictitious transactions. Also, the type of forensic procedures performed by the auditor will depend on the nature of account and its objective.
Using Equation (15), the plausibility that fraud is committed in objective O of account A, given the evidence in Figure 2 , can be written as:
where K is determined by Equation (13) The above model suggests that the overall fraud risk is the product of six fraud risks assessed by the following evidence: 1) factors such as lack of management integrity, presence of incentives, and presence of opportunities, 2) mitigating factors, 3) analytical procedures, 4) test of controls, 5) test of details, and 6) forensic procedures. The above formula can be used to determine the made (Presentations and Disclosures). We will use the term 'Objective' in place of 'Assertion' in this article.
overall fraud risk by assessing the individual components. The simple form of the fraud risk formula as given in (17) is possible only because of the alternative form of Dempster's rule.
Conclusion
We have derived an alternative form of Dempster's rule of combination of evidence for binary variables. This form allows one to compute the combined m-values more efficiently and also allows one to develop analytical formulae for real world problems such as audit risk, fraud risk, independence risk, and etc. Such closed form analytical formulae are needed for assessing the above risks during an audit/assurance engagement.
Figure 1: Seven Items of Evidence pertaining to one Assertion
Customer information is protected from unauthorized internal access and is used in ways associated with the entity's business.
E4: Staff can not directly access the underlying SQL DB that stores customer information.
E3: All requests for data are channeled through a DBA who then requests from operation staff.
E7: Policies and monitoring procedures to ensure only certain employees can access to customer information.
E2: Only a small number of operations staff has access rights to the database.
E5: Policy restricts the staff from disclosing private customer information to any third party.
E6: Clearly states on the web that ABC can give access to customers' private data to other divisions. 
